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IN THE SUPREJVIE COURT 
of the State of U tab 
EZRA J. FJELDSTED, 
Plaintifj, 
VS. 
OGDEN CITY, :1 l'.hmicipal Corpor-
ation; ORA BUNDY, W. J. RACK-
HAM, and FRED E. \VILLIA1\1S as 
City Commissioners of said City; 
HEBER J. HEINER, City Treasur-
er of said City; and J. C. LITTLE-
FIELD, City Recorder of said City, 
Defendants. 
No. 5381 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The defendants in this proceeding, respectfully but 
earnestly petition this Court for a rehearing in this case 
in order that the Court may more fully consider and 
determine some of the more important questions in this 
cause, and particularly the questions relative to limit-
ations on the so-called "special fund doctrine," partic-
ularly in the light of new authority here just called to 
the Court's attention. 
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Counsel for the defendants appreciate that this 
Court has given considerable thought to the case. But 
it is belived, from a study of the decision, that the Court 
has not fully apprehended the relation of the conclus-
ions it reaches to existing law set forth in its own de-
cisions, and those from other jurisdictions, and that a 
further consideration of the cases, including those 
cited by the Court as the foundation of its own opinion, 
and some new authority now cited might result in the 
Court reaching another and different conclusion. 
The Court also, counsel believes, is under some 
misapprehension as to the facts in the matter, as set 
forth by the petition and admitted by the demurrer, 
and we believe that clearer understanding thereof might 
affect the result. 
RESUME OF OPINION 
The Court recites at some length the pleaded facts, 
and it will not be necessary to weary the Court with 
any lengthy resume of the situation in that respect. 
Briefly stated the facts are simply: 
1. That Ogden City is now indebted to such an 
extent that the proposed bond obligations would ex-
ceed ihe constitutional debt limit if thry involve an 
indebtedness in the meaning that word bears under the 
provisions of the Constitution of Utah. 
., 
" 
.2. That an imnwdiate and pressing need exists 
for the making of certain repairs, improvements and 
extensions to the walerworks system of Ogden, a sys-
tem now in operation and already bonded, earning in-
come sufl1cicnt to pay all the expense of its operation 
and maintenance, and to meet all payments of princi-
pal and inte:c·st on boLh the outstanJing and the pro-
posed bonded indebledness as the same would fall due 
GVer the entire period of the proposed new loan. 
3. That to make such a loan, the city proposes 
w retain in its waterworks fund all revenues thereof 
reqmsne for th(· purpose of meeting such new bond 
obligation payments, and that the effect thereof will 
be to discontinue the practice heretofore in force of 
transferring surplus, over expense of operation and 
ordinary betterments, and paymt~ilL of such principal 
<~n·j interest on the· pre:;ent bon(!c;~ indebtedness as the 
city has paid, to the ~<eneral fur:ds [or use on matters 
v.·holly divorced from waterworks improvements. 
4. That it also proposes to pay into that water-
works iund Lhe reasonable value of the water used by 
O;;dcn Cit_y for public purposes. 
FACTS OVERLOOKED 
~ facts appear here which the Court, it appears 
lu counsel have entirely overlooked, or misapprehend-
ed. One is that lhtre is an urgent necessiry for the mak-
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ing of these improvements. The Court is bound to so 
hold, in the absence of any allegation in the petition 
controverting the ordinance in that respect. 
We submit that in matters of a legislative charac-
ter, such as passage of an ordinance, the finding by the 
legislative body of the existence of an emergency, or 
a necessity for the cloing of anything, ordinarily is bind-
ing on the Courts. It may not substitute its-judgmenffor 
that of the legislative body in that regard in the absence 
of clear proof of any ground upon which such a finding 
may be based. Here, the pleading failing totally to 
allege any fact impeaching the finding of the City Com-
mission, as set forth in the ordinance, that there is "an 
immediate and pressing need" for raising funds to make 
these improvements, the Court is bound by that state-
ment of the facts. 
Kenyon Hotel Co. vs. 0. S. L. RR. Co. 62 
Utah 364, 2 20 Pac. 382 33 A. L. R. 343. 
Ogden City vs. Leo 54 l'"tah 556, 182 Pac. 
530, 5 A. L. R. 960. 
The other fact which appears from the pleadings 
' _.,.. 
is that the _Teo~ of the waterworks is amply sufficier:t 
to care for the obligations on the entire funded indebt-
edness so far as the same falls due during that period. 
T[la: tLe Court k:s fo::-med a mistaken view on this 
point appears from the language of the court, on the 
:;::cond pa[~e of its typed decision: 
"The estimate does not therefor include all 
the City's obligations on its bonds during the 15 
year period mentioned." 
Please note that the Court here assumes a fact 
neither pleaded nor necessarily implied from the plead-
ing. The pleading distinctly recites that "the principal 
falling due" on the present bonded indebtedness for 
waterworks of Ogden City during the 15 year period 
in which the new loans are retireable is $3 7 5 ,000.00. 
The Court's assumption is based upon the theory that 
these bonds are all serial bonds running over a 40 year 
period. It overlooks the fact that prior to 19 21, the 
statute (Compiled Laws 1917, Sec. 794) contemplated 
issuance of twenty year term bonds; that in 1921 this 
was changed to permit issuance of either term or serial 
bonds, having a maturity date of forty years, and that 
it is the record thus clearly disclosed, that Ogden City's 
bonds are not all serial in character, and that their 
terms are such that the non-serial bonds fall due in 
large part well after the fifteen year period expires. 
It is the fact as pleaded that the $3 7 5,000 of bonds 
falling due in the 15 year period is the whole of the 
principal on such bonds due in such period. 
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS 
Summarized, the decision of this Court now writ-
ten, upon the matter of the application of the special 
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fund doctrine to the admitted facts, and upon allied 
points of law, may be summarized as follows: 
1. The case of Barnes v. Lehi City is affirmed 
and declared to be still the law of this jurisdiction. That 
is, a city may pledge the revenue from a plant, consist-
in~~ of property it owns, and property it acquires, to 
cover the cost of purchasing the acquired property, 
without incurring a prohibited indebtedness. 
2. But if the property it owns is income e.~-
- . 
~-uci_~&:_prior to acquirement of the new property, the 
income from the property formerly owned may not be 
pledged to pay the new obligation, and if the income 
comes from such scources or the new acquirements are 
of such character that the income from the old and the 
r.cw may not be segregated, then the attemet to pledge_ 
--·~·"""' 
the income, or any of the income from the combined 
old and new parts of the plant is not permissable, and a 
-..__-,__.--
debt is created. For three reasons: 
A. The city may not repudiate the obligation 
and let the seller retake his property, but in lieu thereof 
the City may be compelled to levy reasonable rates 
for water, to place them in the fund, and to pay from 
the: fund on the new bond issues. Future City Com-
missions n:ay not be thus coerced. 
B. The revenues to be impounded in the fund 
are revenues of which the City now is the owner, and 
·--· ..
/ 
/ 
I 
\ 
i 
I 
/ 
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which but for the new obligation would be available 
to meet other obligations of the City. 
C. Revenues from taxation must be indirectly 
used to "feed the spe<:Jitl,ll!.nd:_:...that is the waterworks 
........ ~ ... .--
fund. 
/ 
(NOTE:- Lu the above counsel assumes that 
this Court will stand on the latter part of its opinion 
where it holds that the contractual provision, requiring 
raising of rates for water to a point sufficient to meet 
the obligations of the waterworks iunds, is unconsti-
tutional, and that the City, under the Constitution, 
can and must charge only such rates as are "reason-
able." If that be the case, the argument advanced in 
the opinion of the Court on page 9 thereof, so far as 
it assumes the bondholder to have power to require 
raising of the rates, irresp~ctive of their b~ing reason-
able, is obviously not tenable.) 
If we correctly interpret the rulings of the Court, 
we desire to respectfully submit that the new decision 
upon the law of this subject finds little or no support 
in the decided cases, and substantially none in the 
wses which the Court cites in its opinion as relevant 
thereto. An analysis of these cases and of the opinion 
herein easily establishes this point, counsel believes. 
ANALYSIS OF CASES CITED 
The Court first affirms its opinion in the case of 
Barnes vs. Lehi City-74 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878. 
~-----···-~·~--·~ 
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This is a case where a city, owning a waterworks plant, 
used solely for the supply to the city of its own light-
ing requirements, contracts an obligation for more ma-
chinery under the standard Fairbanks, Morse & Co. 
contract, with the intent of supplying electrical current 
to the public, and pledges the revenue from the sale 
of current to the public, as well as moneys to be paid by 
it into the special fund -it c~es,-=~~~h moneys to be 
··-· ·<---~--·,.._. ................. -.. .......... --,....,_-~ ....................... _. .... . 
paid by it covering the reasonable charge for the cur-
rent used by the city-to the payment of the cost of 
such machinery. The seller retained title to the machin-
ery until the same was paid for, and it may be assumed 
had the usual right of a conditional vendor to retake 
the property on default by the buyer-at least this 
Court so assumes in the present opinion although no 
such statement appears in the facts given in the case 
itself. The installments due on the purchase price are 
evidenced by ''pledge orders", instruments signed by 
the City, evidences of debt if this be a "debt" in the 
constitutional sense, as much as are the proposed bonds 
of Ogden City. There is nothing in the reported case, 
and we venture to assert nothing in these "pledge 
orders" which indicates that these are not enforcible 
obliga~ions except the :imitations which require the 
l:o!der to look to their payment from the "special fund" 
crcuted from the revenue from the waterworks system, 
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and moneys to be paid by the city for the current it 
uses. 
Please also note that in the current opinion this 
Court affirms the Lehi City case so far as it holds that 
the requirement for payment for the city's use of cur-
rent does not change the character of the obligation and 
create a constitutional municipal "indebtedness." 
We desire the Court to consider the implications of 
this case in the light of the current opinion, and of the 
other decided cases. 
First: If .Barnes vs. Lehi City be a correct state-
ment of law, (which we do not wish to be understood 
as disputing) then the following parts of the Court's 
opinion in this case clearly are erroneous: 
"As already indicated, the contract approved 
by this Court in Barnes vs. Lehi City was such a 
contract as could be abandoned at any future time 
by the governing authorities of the city and the 
city would lose nothing of its owned property 
or income and would be under no obligation to 
make further payment. The Contractor would, 
under the express terms of the contract, take back 
its own property and retain the paid installments, 
which would represent merely the earnings from 
the contractor's property. No such results follow 
here. There is no way left open for subsequent 
Boards of City Commissioners to refuse to be 
bound by the debt obligation imposed by the 
bonds. The improvements and betterments are 
' 
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so built into the existing system that they could 
not be segregated. On the other hand the ordin-
ance expressly provides that its terms and obliga-
tions may be enforced by appropriate action in 
lavv or in equity. The City is bound to pay the 
interest on or principal of the bonds and may by 
court action be coerced to raise or maintain the 
wa:er rates suffiCiently to meet such obligations, 
and to continue to divert revenues now owned by 
it, resulting from the operation of its water-
works system, into the special fund to pay the 
water revenue bonds and interest. This is a lia-
bility voluntarily incurred by the city by express 
contract, and which it is bound to pay in money, 
and therefor a 'debt'. Overall vs. City of Madis-
onville, 125 Ky. 684, 102 S. \V. 278, 12 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 433; 17 C.]. 1376." 
It is .. ~l!~~':()US in the following: 
1 : It assumes .th~.Uhe. only remedy of the seller 
--- --·····--~-··' 
is re<;.:lP(i.QJl ... <lL!li§.,l?L?P.erty. No such fact is stated in 
the opinion in Barnes vs. Lehi City. The writer has 
not examined the contract to determine if therein the 
seller expressly waived any remedy save recaption, but 
that fact, if it is a fact, clearly was not deemed of suffi-
cient importance to be even noted in the Court's opin-
ion in that case. And under Fairbanks, Morse & Com-
pany contracts, substantially similar to the Lehi con-
tract, referred to in cases which this Court cites in its 
opinion, it is made clear that the seller does have an-
other remedy, ~hat he docs have a power of "coercion" 
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and that such fact alone does not constitute the obli-
gation an indebtedness. 
Bell vs. City of Fayette 325 Mo. 75, 28 S. W. 
( 2nd)3=-=5~7 .------
This latter case expressly holds that under such 
contracts the seller either may retake his property, but 
may proceed by mandamus to enforce, (or coerce) the 
city to comply with its contract, maintain the special 
fund and pay the "pledge orders" issued under the con-
tract therefrom. And it expressly holds that this does 
not create an indebtedness since the action is not on 
debt but to enforce a contractual right, i.e. the right 
to have the fund maintained and applied as agreed. 
"So ::Vlandamus lies to compel payment oi a 
claim a~ainst a srecial fun~i "hich is in existence 
and in the hands of the proper officer." 38 C. ]. 
7 69, and note No. 50 thereunder. 
And there can be no question that mandamus will 
lie to compel the deposit of public funds in accordance 
with law. (38 C. ]. 759) 
In fact, as it clearly pointed out in decided cases, 
in Barnes vs. Lehi City a stronger objection to the rule 
of the special fund is to be found than in the Ogden 
case since there the obligee has his remedy, not only 
in mandamus, or other appropriate remedy to enforce 
t 
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the contractual obligation, but has the additional rem-
edy of taking from the city property in which it has 
acquired a valuable equity, where in practical effect 
new ground of coercion arises. We submit, in all fair-
ness, that this coercion will apply as much to Lehi City, 
and will as likely tend to induce its officers to expend 
moneys from the general fund if requisite to retain 
their investment in the purchased machinery, as it 
would so operate had the moneys all be paid from the 
general fund. 
The Court seems to intimate that there is some-
thing new, something contrary to the spirit of our in-
stitutions, in a legislative body, such as a city commis-
sion binding the corporate bocty it represents in such 
manner that the future commissioners may not be able 
to esc~pe from that action. \Ve cannot conceive that 
this court so intends to hold. Nor that it intends to 
hold that any contract involving future action by the 
city, creates an "indebtedness." If city commissioners 
may not bind their succesors in matters dealing with 
the city's affairs, then contracts such as Salt Lake City 
makes for furnishing water to residents in the county 
in exchange agreements are void. All bond issues of 
any kind, howsoever authorized, become nullities. Long 
term leases of property for public use may not be made. 
No "special fund" cases have been rightly decided, 
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since even m those cases, which we understand the 
court still to approve, such as 
\ 
\ 
\Vinston vs. Spokane 41 Pac. S88: 
Shields vs. Loveland 74 Colo. 27. 218 Pac. 
913; 
Shelton vs. City of Los Angeles 206 Cal. 544, 
275 P. 421. 
municipal corporations are bound by acts of present 
governing bodies as to their present acts. 
Particularly may we call attention to the last sent-
ence of this quoted language, and to the authority upon 
which the Court therein seems to hold that any "liability 
voluntarily incurred by the city by express contract, 
and which it is bound to pay in money" is a "debt". 
The case of Overall vs. Madisonville there cited, 
which uses the quoted language does so apparently not 
with the intent of reaching an absolute definition of 
the term nor in any careful analysis of the phrase. The 
definition is given, more or less, in an "aside". The 
questions involved did not require further definition. 
The definition from Corpus Juris is the general 
definition found under that phrase. There can be no 
(lUarrel with it as a genrral definition. But this Court 
has already adopted in Barnes vs. Lehi City, a much 
more restricted definition of this term ''debt", holding 
that the word takes a meaning much less broad and 
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comprehensive than it bears in general usage. Nay, as 
we have pointed out, under the Lehi City Contract, 
that city assumed an obligation, payable in money, by 
express contract, and may be bound to its payment, so 
far as the special fund will admit. 
The definition most often followed is that con-
tained in Bell vs. City of Fayette, heretofore referred 
to: 
"The constitutional limitation on the debt 
which a municipality may incur contemplates a 
debt which must be raid b:,· a resort to taxation." 
To adopt the definition given by the Court, is to 
hold that in no case where "special fund bonds" have 
been isst:ed, in payment for an entirely new system, 
all revenue of which is ascribed to the purchase, can 
anythi~g arise other than by "debt" so that the "special . i, 
' (~ ( . 
fund doctrine" in all its branches, must willy nilly be ' 1 
repudiated by the Court. u}·~. 
\Ve do not apprehend that the Court so intends. 
S'J'ATE VS. CITY OF PORTAGE 174 Wis. 588, 
184 N. W. 376. 
This case is cited by the Court following its argu-
men·~ that if the special fund be made up of revenues 
from property owned by a city, a new obligation, altho 
limited to payment from such fund, is a debt. The Court 
' . 
,.-;' 
lfi 
cites certain language therein which very aptly would 
apply to that ruling, if the Court correctly construes 
this case. But we beg leave to call to the attention of 
the Court the context in which this language is used. 
In the Portage case, the statute required Wisconsin 
cities, upon order of the state Railroad Commission, 
to make purchase of or improvements to waterworks 
systems, and to give mortgages, in the nature of pur-
chase money mortgages, upon the system as security 
for the purchase price. The Court first considers its 
own former decisions, involving cases where purchase 
of park lands, the purchase moneys being solely se-
cured by a lien thereon, and not being corporate obli-
gations, were held not void as creating indebtedness, 
and then referred to the case of Burnham vs. Milwau-
kee, 98 Wis. 128, 73 N. W. 1019, where the city 
acquired property upon which there existed a mort-
gage, which the city must pay "to hold and protect 
the interest acquired in it," in which case the Wiscon-
sin Court held that the mortgage obligation became 
a city "indebtedness", because by non-payment thereof 
the city would lose property in which it had invested 
general fund moneys. Under these circumstances, the 
court held there was coer:!on 1 and that that was a dis-
--~.- .... _.....__~-·~· ·---
tinguishable factor, using here cited language: 
The decision in the Portage case itself is 
based solely upon the ground that compliance with 
16 
the order of the Railroad Commission "would 
result in m<2.rtgagjug the city's existing water-
works-to s;cure the payment of a corporate debt 
incurred after the works were acquired by the 
City." 
This case is authority for no more than the rule 
that a city may not pledge property, (not revenue) it 
then holds to p~ymt;""rrt;;{~~bli~ation, and still claim 
the obligation not to be a debt because "payable from 
a special funds." \ 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVENUE AND 
PROPERTY 
That there is a distinction between the action of 
a city in pledging revenue, and in mortgaging its cur-
rently owned property to payment of an obligation is 
clearly held: 
"We have no difficulty in reaching the con-
clusion that the bonds which it is proposed to 
issue are not debts within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, if they are to be paid out of the income 
and revenue derived from the operation of the 
waterworks plant. If the waterworks system could 
be taken to discharge the debts, then the bonds 
would create a prohibited, indebtedness." 
Bowlin!j Green vs. Kirby (Ky) 295 S. W. 1004. 
Also Ward vs. Chicago (infra) 
Please note that the Bowling Green case is almost 
squarely on all fours with the Ogden case. There the 
17 
city had a $600,000 plant in operation. It was inade-
quate, and extensions were planned costing $309,000-
00. If this new obligation constituted "indebtedness" 
it exceeded the constitutional limitations. The City set 
up from its waterworks revenues 45 'fo to care for oper-
ation and maintenance, 10% for depreciation, and 45 'lo 
for payment of the new bond issue. (Please nole that 
the water works revenues required for Ogden City to 
make payment of its proposed bond issue will be less 
than 4516 of its net revenue after payment of all oper-
ating expense.) 'i'he waterworks revenue had prev-
.... q.~ ... •• ----~-~-... ,.,. 
iousiy gone tq...$t.J.£UJ1..fwuls. The Court had under con-
sideration substantially all the cases cited in the Ogden 
Case, except Garret vs. Swanton, including the Illinois 
cases, but held that the pledging of the waterworks re-
ceipts for construction of waterworks, and "their trans-
fer from the general to a special (und does not create a 
new inJebtPdness within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.'' It then defines ''debt" in the Constitutional 
sense, as follows: 
''If the bonds are issued, they are not the 
obligations of the municipality as a corporate 
entity. No tax can be levied to pay either the 
bonds or the interest thereon. The ordinance care-
fully provides that the bonds and interest must 
be paid out of the income from the operation of 
the waterworks plant. If the debt cannot be dis-
charged in that manner, then it cannot be dis-
18 
charged at all so far as the municipality is con-
cerned. There is no power to impose a tax on the 
property within the city to discharge the obliga-
tions. If a city cannot be compelled to pay the 
debt, it is not an indebtedness falling within the 
provisions of either Section 157 or Section 158 
of the Constitution." 
CASES CITED ON "DEBT" 
This Court cites numerous cases at the bottom of 
page 9 of its decision, in support of the view that the 
Ogden City facts arc such as to make the proposed 
bond issue a "debt." \Ve will pass argument on Gar-
ret vs. Swanton for the time, as it deserves special 
treatment, but taking tl:e rest in order: 
Hesse vs. City of Watertown 57 S. D. 325, 232 
X. W. 53. 
This case is decided wholly on a question of statu-
tory, not constitutional, objection. The statutes in ques-
tion require, among other things, that the bonds issued 
be negotiable. The case refers to Bowling Green vs. 
Kirby, and expressly distinguishes that case by point-
ing out that the bonds were there issued were not 
attacked for want of statutory authority, but that the 
constitutional question only was involved in the Kirby 
case. 
It will be kept in mind that this Court has held 
that there is no need of statutory authority for the 
issuance of the present bonds. 
2 rZ 
l~l 
Hight v. Harrisonville 328 Mo. 549, 41 S. W. 
(2nd) 155. 
This was another Fairbanks, Morse & Co. case. 
Here under substantially an identical contract with 
that found in the Lehi case the question involved was 
solely whether or not the requirement, that the city 
must pay into the special fund charges for the current 
it itself used, invalidated the contract. The court says: 
·'Ohlig~l~ion:; dio;c1};_:r:l;:::<ible solely out oi a 
~:pccial ftmd to the ;'aymc::1t of which lhe general 
credit uf the mur:icipality is not pledged are nevcr-
th~lcss debt~: o; ~he city fo · L~:c purpose of t~·.c 
COUSLitutiGJal I;mit<.,:i:ms :' t: l~ fund is the pro-
duct of taxation .. , 
·-·--.-~ ... --... --." 
We do not a:c;sume that this Court in citing this 
ca~e has any intention of overruling its decision in 
both the Lehi case and the Ogden case that the pay· 
ment for the city's use of light or water docs not make 
the obligation a deLlt. So we assume no further ;ltten-
tion need be paid this case. 
Campbell v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. 55 F. (2nd) 
155. 
\Ve concede that this is authority against the 
position taken by Ogden City in this proceeding. BUT 
it is only such authority if this Court is willing to re-
\ 
\ 
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verse itself, and concede Barnes v. Lehi City to be bad 
law. 
In the City of Campbell case, that City in Feb-
ruary, 1930, held a bond election to authorize expendi-
ture of public moneys on erection of a power house, 
etc., for a lighting system. Less than two months later, 
on April 5th, 1930, it entered into a typical Fairbanks, 
Morse & Co. contract for machinery with which to 
equip that power house. This machinery, it is apparent 
on examination of the opinion, was an entegral part of 
the p!ant, requisite before any revenue could come 
from the plant. The Court says: 
"The defendant, Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 
made delivery of the machinery covered by the 
contract which was installed in the power house, 
on the foundations constructed by the city, and 
the plant was put in operation by the city in No-
vember, 1930." 
This Court went far past this decision in the Lehi 
case. The City of Campbell only furnished a power 
house and foundations for use as a shelter and bed for 
the machinery if purchased. Lehi City furnished not 
o~ly the power house and the foundations but also the 
existing distributing system as well. Yet this court sus-
t.ai;1c d the power of tl:is City to make that contract. 
We find no indications in the opinion before us that 
this court is any more disposed to follow the Camp-
21 
bell case than it is to follow the Harrisonville case. 
Zachary v. City of Wagoner 146 Okla. 268, 292 
P. 345. 
Another case which would justify overruling 
Barnes v. Lehi City, but which means nothing so long 
as that case remains settled law in this jurisdiction. It 
goes further, even, than the other cases, holding that a 
purchase of new electric light plant equipment, to be 
paid for solely from the savings in cost of operation to 
be effected through its installation, was prohibited. 
The Court repudiates the whole "special fund doctrine" 
so far as Oklahoma is concerned: 
"\Ve are not unmindful of the rule followed 
in some jurisdictions that the purchase of prop-
erty does not create an indebtedness if the pur-
chase price is to be paid out of the income there-
from (citing cases) but we cannot follow such 
holding." 
Even the limitations made bv 1he C,.,,,.. i,-. +J,,.. 
current opinion go beyond this case, where clearly the 
payments came from income which the city would not 
have had in the absence of the new equipment. 
Miller v. City of Buhl. 48 Ida. 668, 284 P. 843. 
-----·---.. --
This case also repudiates the "special fund" doc-
trine in tot,. It is decided wholly on the authority of 
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Feil v. Cour D'Alene, (129 Pac. 643,42 L. R. A. (NS) 
1095) in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
under the Idaho Constitution, containing the word 
"liability" as well as the word "indebtedness" in the 
limitation sections relating to cities, the former word 
had a wider meaning than the latter, and that the cases 
upholding the special fund doctrine had no application 
m Idaho. 
Fox v. Bicknell 193 Ind. 537, 141 N. E. 222. 
In this case, the Indiana Supreme Court expressly 
upheld the special fund doctrine, the case involving 
solely the creation of a fund from the income of an 
entire plant purchased, to retire the bonds issued to 
cover the purchase price. In the opinion it points out 
that general taxes cannot be levied to pay the debts, 
that there is no pledging or mortgaging of property 
it already owned, no pledging of income it was entitled 
to receive, etc., but does this solely in distinguishing 
the case from other cases, including Schnell v. Rock 
Island, ( 232 Ill. 89, 83 N. E. 462, 14 L. R. A. (NS) 
8 7 4) now no longer law in Illinois on the point in 
question. It does not hold that the presence of any of 
these factors would change its decision. We submit 
that there is here neither any required finding, nor any 
intent to hold that the facts presented in the Ogden 
ca,;e would involve a "debt." 
i ' 
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It is interesting to note that Garret vs. Swanton 
relies almost wholly for its authority upon City of 
Campbell v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Company 
(supra.) It finds no other support, and cites no other 
case except Schnell v. City of Rock Island (supra). 
·while numerous citations of cases are given in the 
quoted portion of the Campbell and Rock Island cases, 
none of those cases are themselves assigned as author-
ity, and the Court will note from the previous part of 
this brief that most of them are not in any wise applic-
able in a state which recognizes the special fund doc-
trine. Even the language quoted from the Fayette case 
had reference to a situation wholly different from that 
presented in the California case or here. (See citation 
from McQuillin, Munc. Corp. Sect. 2389 with reference 
to which that quotation occurs.) 
Frankly, the writer thinks that the California 
court desired to depart from the special fund doctrine, 
and having evolved the theory of the danger that the 
special fund must be fed attempted to support it by 
t'i ; .. _. ' 
authority, even though the authority had to be finely , 'h \ · 
/ ./ 
strained. 
{ 
Of course this does not apply to the citation of 
the Rock Island case. The Illinois Court concedes that 
in Illinois the special fund doctrine has no application. 
It says: 
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"The argument that no indebtedness is cre-
ated where the obligation is to pay under some 
fixed and definite scheme, from some particular 
fund, which is pledged for payment, is sustained 
by decisions. of other courts; but after so many 
/ 
'years'o(]lidicT~f~~il"s{;{~~·tron, extending from the 
case of Springfielcl v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626, to 
LDhdcJl v. Chicago, .227 Ill. 208, 81 N. E. 354, 
it !s not necessary and we would not enter anew 
upon a discussion of the meaning of our Consti-
tution." 
/fo :;' :·t· c''' 
Neither Schnell v. Rock Island, (nor also Joliet 
v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N. E. 861) are law even 
in Illinois, in view of the decision in Ward vs. Chicago, 
hereafter referred to at length. 
SLIM MARY OF CASES CRITICIZED 
It thus appears that, of the cases which the 
Court cites in support of its opinion that the bonds 
O:~de:;1 City would issue will constitute a debt, the 
Harrisville Case, the: Campbell Case, the Wagoner 
case and the Buhl case are not such authority, but are 
authority that the Barnes v. Lehi case is wrong. The 
\\'atcrtown case would seem to be authority for power !___!_:!~ 
~o incur sucl1 an obligation where statutory provisions 
do nut p·cvent, since it seems to agree with the Bow-
ling ~en case, and the case of Fox v. Bicknell is not 
decided on the point at issue here. That leaves only 
/ 
{~arret v. Swanton, ~~ml its decision is founded on an 
···~r-"""'',H'' ., 
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even weaker line of citations, for a state which recog-
nizes the "special fund doctrine" at all, than is the 
Ogden case; let alone the novel theory of the Calif-
ornia court as to feeding of special funds, which in any 
case is applicable to a situation the exact opposite of 
that before us here, as we will show, later. 
Before this Court used the language we have had 
under criticism, it referred to the Lehi City case, and 
cited as similar cases the Fayette case and 
Jones v. City of Corbin, 227 Ky. 674, 13 S. W. 
(2nd) 1013. 
Yet this Corbin case is far more than authority 
for the Lehi City case-we think at least it is squarely 
authority for the case now before this court. There the 
city authorities created a special fund, and directed 
that into it be set apart 15 ;7<; of the revenue of a public 
utility it then owned for the purpose of purchasing 
new equipment. After some three or four months, in-
come at the rate of $1500 per month from this scource 
having created some $7000.00 of funds, it used that 
as a down payment on the equipment and pledged the 
15% of its gross revenues to the payment of the bal-
ance. 
It seems aparent from the facts before the Court 
m the Ogden case that the amount Ogden City may 
have to pay annually on the proposed bond issue will 
not so greatly exceed 15 l}'o of its gross revenue as to 
materially alter the situation in this case from the Cor-
bin case. 
FEEDING OF THE SPECIAL FUND 
This Court seems, at least impliedly, to have 
adopted the theory on which its opinion is based pri-
marily on the case of Garrett v. Swanton . As noted 
above, that attempts to lay down a principle restricting 
::1.0plication of the special fund doctrine to cases where 
there is no need of "feeding the special fund." 
The decision in this case, primarily, rests upon 
the theory that the city of Santa Cruz had placed it-
self in a position where it must "feed the special fund" 
from general revenues. There the city had in effect 
an ordinance which already obligated the special fund 
created in its waterworks department to meet the pay-
ments on principal and the interest on its current bond-
ed debt. ( 13 Pac. ( 2) 72 9, col. 2.) It argues that "if the 
water fund be depleted by the payments made to Fair-
banks, :Morse & Co. for the pumping plant, the fund 
created for the payn1ent of interest and principal on tlw 
bonds will be depleted," and "since such bonds are a 
general obligation of the city. the taxpayers must at all 
times be ready to feed the special fund .if the income is 
not suff1cient to pay both interest and principal on the 
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bonds and the payments to Fairbanks, Morse and 
Company. It follows, of course, that, when this con-
tract vvas executed, the taxpayers became indirectly 
liable to pay the amount thereof." 
It seems to us that the material difference between 
the ordinances in effect in Santa Cruz and in Ogden 
City makes the reasoning of the California Court in-
applicable on this point. In both cases, the outstanding 
bonds are obligations of the general fund. But in the 
Santa Cruz case, the ordinance of that city requires 
that the special waterworks fund make payment of 
the principal and interest on the bonds; in the Utah 
case the ordinance does not so provide, and merely 
permits the City Commission to provide for payment 
'Lherefrom in its discretion. The Ogden outstanding 
bonds are not now, and never have been charges upon 
anything except the tax revenues of the city. 
\Ve come again to the argument which this Court 
dismisses rather hastily and, we think, illadvisedly, in 
ti1c opinion under discussion. There is, and the Court 
agrees with us, no reason why Ogden City,-as it in 
fact now is doing- cannot retain the whole of its 
\':aterworks revenue in its special fund, levy taxes and 
make payment of its principal and interest on outstand-
ing bonds, and pay into that fund the reasonable 
charges for the water it uses itself. No obligation of 
I 
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any kind rests upon the city to use any of its water-
works income for any purposes, other than mainten-
ance and minor betterments. 
There is then, in the Ogden City case, no ques-
tion of feeding a special fund from general revenue. 
What Ogden City has been doing, perhaps illadvisedly, 
i:-; to feed its general funds from special revenues. 
Instead of setting up depreciation accounts, and acquir-
ing reserves from which to keep its system in repair, 
it has used the money which came in for other muni-
cipal purposes. 
Meantime its main transmission system, consisting 
of two pipe lines, is in dangerous shape. The old pipe 
line, after forty-five years of use, lets 20% of the 
water supply leak away, not only wasting the water, 
but perhaps endangering the city's rights to preserve it, 
and certainly placing the city in a position where slides 
du~ to leakage may result in damage to private prop-
erty and such actions against the city as have hereto-
fore reached this very Court. 
Its great mains, leading from its reservoirs, also 
nearly half a century old, leak away another taro to 
15 ro of all the water supplied to them, causing sinking 
oi pavement, a!1d other damage, and depleting the 
city's resources, while the pumps at the artesian wells 
run at constan~ expense to bring forth water to make 
up these losses. Summer water uses draw the present 
reservoirs down to such dangerously small reserves 
that the fire hazard is extremely high, and the city 
has escaped disaster by narrow margins on more than 
one occasion. 
And with all this, the city fathers have blithely 
poured into various other forms of municipal expendi-
ture the revenues of the waterworks system which 
should have been used to prevent depreciation and 
build up funds with which to make the improvements 
needed. Perhaps with good reason at that! For this 
court knows that one administration, which seeks to 
save funds, must realize that it will be met with de-
feat at the polls from candidates who would use the 
saved funds to lower taxes. The whole political system 
is so shaped as to make tbe voluntary accumulation 
of a proper r2serve for caring for such a situation as 
Ogden City nmv faces impossible, as a practical mat-
ter. 
These arguments, so far as based on the city's 
current situation, are probably not within the plead-
ings to the extent that they detail facts presently exist-
ing. But the Court is bound to know that there is an 
urgent public necessity for the doing of the improve-
ments which the bond issue would admit. The Court 
mpst realize, indeed knows as a matter of law, that 
• 
::o 
the City if it cannot borrow as it seeks to do, must 
conserve at long last its waterworks revenues, must 
probably in view of the urgency existing levy taxation 
to the limit of its powers to raise funds to make the 
needed improvements. 
\V e submit then that any argument based upon the 
assumption that the taxes of the city will be in the 
least reduced by the failure of the bond issue to carry 
is pure theory with no foundation in fact. It seems 
novel to counsel that any court, would be entitled to 
assume the continued existence of any such state of 
facts with regard to handling of the public moneys. 
This Court, we think, should rather assume that the 
taxpayer's condition will be better if the cost of the 
improvements to be made are spread over 15 years 
by a bond issue, rather than paid for in four or five 
years from increased taxes and complete use of all 
waterworks funds for that purpose. 
But the Court advises us that there is a difference 
between the city retaining its water rates for such use, 
as it lawfully may do, as that is expenditure for a lawful 
purpose, and use of exactly the same means to pay off 
moneys obtained to do the needed work at once, while 
materials and labor are cheap, as a unit, saving the 
losses inevitable to piecemeal carrying on of such a 
project. This the Court tells us, is incurring a "debt". 
:n 
May counsel respectfully submit to the Court 
that it merely argues in a circle when it so declares. 
The question before the Court is whether or not there 
is a "debt" created. One ground for such a ruling lies 
in this "special fund feeding" theory. We point out 
that the theory cannot apply, because we do not feed 
the special fund, we merely cease to feed the general 
fund improvidently with special fund revenue. And 
the Court replies that that makes no difference, "debt" 
is created. The argument assumes the very fact it is 
designed to establish. 
AUTHORITY SUPPORTING CITY'S POSITION 
The effect of the preceding argument is of course 
pointed towards destructive criticism of the court's 
viewpoint. The Court may pro;Jerly criticize us unless 
we add to this matter of constructive character. This 
we haste to do, and we desire to call the court's atten-
tion: 
First, to new authority, not heretofore cited, or 
where cited, not so definitely called to the Court's 
attention as to sufficiently aid the Court. 
Second, to one new line of reasoning from the 
authorities which we think worthy of consideration 
as a rule establishing a line of demarcation in the de-
cided opinions. 
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Schnell v. Rock Island, and the case on which it 
is based. Joliet v. Alexander1 as we have pointed out, 
mark the extreme limits of the rule contra to the Ogden 
City position. These cases are cited in almost every 
decision which this Court has mentioned in its opinion. 
In them can be found the only clear basis for the 
opinion in Garrett v. Swanton. We call the Court's 
attention to the fact that the Supreme Court of Illinois 
has repudiated the doctrine of these cases, at least so 
far as the same applies to the identical situation now 
before this Court: 
Ward v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 167, 173 N. E. L-~--~ 
810. 
Chicago owned and operated its waterworks sys-
tem. The State of Illinois passed a statute which 
authorized that city to sell waterworks certificates of 
indebtedness to the extent of $12,000,000.00, stating 
on their face that they were payable solely from the 
revenues of the waterworks sytem, "for the purpose of 
paying the cost of improving and extending the water-
works system." 
Chicago then passed an ordinance providing for 
certain improvements. This ordinance ( 1) created a 
special fund into which the revenues of the waterworks 
system is to pass; ( 2) provided that from it main ten-
ance and operating expense should be paid; ( 3) pro-
vided that there should be also paid from it "obligations 
of the city heretofore issued that are payable by their 
terms from such revenue, whether in the form of certi-
ficates, bonds or otherwise," and the certificates issued 
under the provisions of the ordinance for the proposed 
improvements and repairs. 
The question of whether or not such bonds con-
stitute "indebtedness'' under the Constitution of Illinois 
is dire~tly raised in the case. The Court first calls 
attention to its own decision in Maffitt v. City of 
Decatur, 322 Ill, 82, 152 N. E. 602, where it had held 
valid an obligation to pay a corporation compensation 
from water rates for lands flooded by the city in con-
structing a dam for its waterworks system. The City 
of Decatur had exhausted its bonding power under 
general law, and could not buy the lands, so it insti-
gated the formation of a corporation to buy the lands, 
and make such a contract. After considering the 
Decatur case, the Court says: 
·· h i:; apparent that tile gcne:al situation in 
the present case is similar to that in the Decatur 
case, and that the obligation which it is proposed 
to crca~c here cannot be said to be, from the stand-
point of the City fundarncntally different from 
the one which was there involved. There the city 
already had a complete water system in operation, 
but the addition of new elements was necessary 
• 
if it \\'as to be made adequate to meet the city's 
growing needs. (As in the case of Ogden City's 
new reservoir.) Here the proposed new elements 
take a different form but their purpose is the 
same. 
''There the existing disposition of water 
rents was done away with and all moneys received 
from the system went into one fund out of which 
certain operating expenses were taken. Although 
the value of the addition to the plant was no 
greater than that of the remainder of the plant 
exclusive of the addition, an apparently arbitrary 
percentage of nine-tenths of the remainder of this 
fund was then alloted to the water company which 
financed this addition. Here all re·uenues received 
from the water system is to be deposited in a sep-
arate fund, out of which are to be paid all main-
tenance and operating expense, and the remainder 
is to be a';;ailablc to pay back those who finance 
tJ:r proposed extensions by purchasing the certi-
ficates. 
"There the amount coming into the water 
fund w~1s c!epenrlent upon rates fixed by the city, 
a::d the amm:nt in the water fund here will be 
determined in the same manner. There compen-
sation for the water company came solely from 
the water fund thus created and no obligation to 
pay was imposed upon the City. Here no portion 
of the plant is pledged for payment and holders of 
certificates have no recourse save out of the pro-
posc·d water fund. That the obligation of the city 
:1ruse there out of a simple reciprocal contract, 
(as in Barnes v. Lehi City) whereas here it would 
be represented by rlocuments in the form of ne-
gotiable uotes can make no difference so far as 
the question at issue is concerned. If no indebted-
ness within the constitutional limitation was creat-
ed there, no substantial reason exists for saying 
that any would be created here. 
"The main reliance of appellant is upon the 
case of Joliet v. Alexander-(supra). The City 
of Joliet, owning a system of waterworks, had 
passed an ordinance providing for extensions 
thereto. To pay for these extensions water fund 
certificates were issued. These certificates were 
secured by a mortgage which covered both the 
existing system and the extension constructed un-
der the ordinance. The Court properly held that 
an indebtedness within the constitutional prohi-
bition was created. Counsel for the appellant la:v 
considerable stress upon certain language of 
the opinion to the effect that indebtedness 
within such constitutional prohibition ma3• 
be __ created .. by .. pledging ... an .. existing. tn-
come of the city. ,\rguing that in the 
present ca~e there can be !1'J wav of determining 
how much income would be attributable to the 
enlargement of the system when made or how 
much would be attributable to the new rates when 
put into effect; that the so-called new income 
cannot be segregated from the present income; 
that the present income will thercbJ be tL!.ken 
away and lost; and that so cutting it off and 
pledging it will create an indebtedness within the 
meaning of the language invoked. (How concise 
a statement of the petitioner's position in this 
proceeding.) 
"The position thus taken seems to be that 
pledging the water fund creates indebtedness with-
in the constitutional prohibition unless the pledge 
is confined to such precise income as can be 
directly traced to the particular new physical 
element of the plant to pay for which the obliga-
tion secured was issued, leaving the original in-
come intact and usable by the city for other pur-
poses altogether. The Decatur case is decisive 
<tgainst the soundness of such a position. There 
the income from the original plant was in effect 
cut off and lumped into the fund resulting from 
the operation of the plant as enlarged. It is not 
apparent that any effort was there made to pre-
sen'e such original income intact or exempt it in 
any manner or degree from the claim of the water 
rornpany or that moneys made available to the 
water company under the contract were at all 
limited to income traceable to the elements of 
the plant which it had financed." (Interpolations 
and italics are ours.) 
Please note: That Schnell v. Rock Island, and 
the case of Joliet v. Alexander upon which it bases its 
opinion, is the foundation of every case adversely limit-
ing the special fund doctrine where any question of the 
use of other property of the city, or income, is based. 
The Joliet case is the sole authority for the Schnell 
case. The Schnell case in turn, and particularly its 
quotations from the Joliet case, is the underpinning 
of the whole line of authority adverse to the Ogden 
bond issue in any respect. 
Counsel for defendants apologizes to the Court for 
being so belated in calling its attention to this decisive 
opinion. His excuse is simply that the Illinois cases 
had been so strongly against the position taken by the 
city that he had not deemed it worth while to run them 
down. The other cases hereafter cited are partly of 
recent vintage, and found by inspection of a digest 
published since the argument of this cause, in part 
cases which now seem in point in the light of the 
Court's opinion, but did not seem so formerly, and 
some to which we think the Court gave insufficient 
weight in the present opinion. 
Sowell v. Griffiith (Tex) 294 S. W. 521 ' · 
• 
Bowling Green v. Kirby (supra) , .. 
McCuthcin v. City of Siloam Springs (Ark.) 49~-· : ·:' ' ' •· 
S. W. (2nd) 1037 
Johnson Y. City of Stuart 1 Ia.) 2?(} N. W. 164 
Searle v. City of Hautun (Colo.) 2 71 Pac. 630. 
In Sowell v. Griffith, under the city charter a fund 
was created to which went all of the waterworks reven-
ues, and from which was paid the cost of operation and 
maintenance, and the amounts due and outstanding on 
bond issues for the plant. The charter provided that 
any surplus could be used for general fund purposes 
to reduce taxes. The case represents a close parallel 
to the Ogden decision, but is stronger against us in 
that when the attacked obligation was sought to be 
incurred, the city had previously issued obligations 
against the fund. The Texas court find the provisions 
:lH 
consonant with the constitution m that the proposed 
issuance of obligations against this special fund do 
not constitute "debt". 
McCutchin v. Siloam Springs. 
The city built a light plant in 1918, issuing bonds 
to provide means for its construction and installation. 
When the proposed obligation came up, these bonds 
had been paid, and the net revenue belonged to the 
city, which owned in addition to the plant 25 miles 
of distribution system. and other property used to 
produce revenue in the system. It was proposed to 
build a new power plant with new equipment on land 
belonging to the city, and to pay for the same by im-
pounding the revenue of the entire system, above 
cost of maintenance and operations, the improvements 
being found to be necessary because the old power 
house and plant were obsolete, if not fairly well worn 
out. The proposed obligation was attached under a 
constitutional provision. (Amendment No. 10) pro-
hibiting incurrence of "indebtedness" in excess of cur-
rent revenues. which it was admitted would occur if 
the obligation represented "indebtedness." The Court 
flatly holds that no such indebtedness arises. The case 
does not discuss at length the application of revenues 
presently held, but points out that the city authorities 
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might deem the expenditures necessary to preserve 
current revenues. 
Johnston v. City of Stuart. 
This case stands exactly on all fours with Barnes 
v. Lehi City EXCEPT that the Iowa town had a going 
plant from which it was in receipt of revenues, a fact ( 
which is completely without effect on the ultimate de-
cision of the court. 
Bowling Green v. Kirby. 
This case has been so extensively gone into before 
that further comment would seem unnecessary. It 
squarely supports our view and is the most cited case 
thereon. 
Searle v. Hartun. 
A situation squarely on all fours with that here 
is presented. The Court points out that in every case, 
except that of Schnell v. Rock Island, which is de-
cided contra to the right of the city to proceed, a mort-
gage or pledge of property was in some wise involved. 
It says: 
"We see, however, no difference in substance 
between a promise or pledge of the future income 
of property which now has an income, and the 
promise or pledge of the future income of prop-
erty which now has none. If one would make the 
sum secured a debt, the other would. In either 
case, the income is produced by property already 
-W 
owned Ly the City, which seems to be the condi-
tion condemned by the cases cited by plaintiff on 
this point." 
Reviewing briefly this part of the argument, may 
we again submit that the departure of the Illinois Court, 
in its overruling of the Joliet case, seems to us to 
weaken if not destroy the effect of all the authority 
extant whicl1 in any wise supports the present opinion 
of the Court; that the Chicago case, the Arkansas 
case, th~~ Iowa case, the Kentucky case, the Texas 
case and the Colorado case comprize highly import-
ant additions to the cases supporting the view Ogden 
City takes herein. In the light of this authority, largely 
fir:-t called to the Court's attention, we feel entitled 
to assert that the overwhelming weight of opinion is 
adverse ~o the decision of this Court as now written, 
an;J to a::;k that that opinion be re-examined. 
Stccond. as to new matter, may we ask the Court to 
considtr, as i,.; done is ~;ome of the cases noted, 'lhe 
l'ilect of its decision as to extensive repairs. We may 
a~;sume for this that the Courts such as North Dakota. 
which have followed thP former Illinois ruling, would 
still rm~sist in spite of \1.-ard v. Chicago. But in none 
of them is there raised a question of the right to incur 
"''c:1 oLlir~aticns for tl'e purpose of making neces-
sary repairs to the system for the purpose of preserv-
:.:g the incom·.· it now yif'lds. Clearly if the mains and 
. Jl 
the canyon pipe line fail, the City will be without 
revenue. In that case, would this Court hesitate to 
approve incurring of obligations to repair the mains, 
or pipe lines, in order that the revenue might be res-
tored? If not, upon what ground of public policy is 
there to be found reason for prohibiting use of the 
same means to prevent such failure and to protect and 
assure continuation of present revenue. The point is 
touched on in one or more of the cases herein cited, 
and will not be amplified. but we call to the Court's 
attention that even in the North Dakota case of Wilder 
v. Murphy, (218 N. W. 156) where the use of income 
of existing dormitories, where pledged to pay for con-
struction of entirely new and separate structures is 
forbidden on the authority of Schnell v. Rock Island, 
no question of repairs to existing dormitories, required 
to preserve their income yield was involved. And that 
in Lang v. Cavalier, 288 N. W. 825, recently decided, 
the North Dakota court departs materially from its 
position in the Wilder case. 
In closing, we direct the Court's attention again 
to the fact that in Barnes v. Lehi City this court has 
approved the u.se- of f roperty, already owned by the 
city, in earning revenue to be applied towards pay-
ment of a new obligation. We further call attention to 
the fact that this was revenue producing property, in 
that it saved to Lehi City the cost of purchasing cur-
• 
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rent and distribution thereof from private interests. 
We call attention to the fact that this present revenue, 
this saving, was lost to the taxpayers under the court's 
then decision, since it affirmed the right of the city 
to make payment therefor from general taxes into the 
special fund to be used to pay the new obligation. And 
consistently with that opinion, \Ve again ask the Court 
to reconsider the present decision which seems to us 
utterly inconsistent with affirmation of the Barnes 
case. 
We submit: 
That the decided cases do not support the opinion 
of the Court upon the point in question; that in view 
of the holding by the court that any rates must be 
re::1sonable, (and clearly to be reasonable they must 
neither be too high nor too low) there can be no un-
iawful coercion exercised upon future city authorities; 
a:-~d that the bond issues should be sustained, and re-
;,caring granted. 
STUART P. DOBBS, 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS. 
